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________________ 
 
OPINION THE COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 This case has a familiar cast of characters: two co-
defendants, a confession, and a jury. And, for the most part, it 
follows a conventional storyline. In the opening chapter, one 
of the defendants (Miguel Garcia) in a murder case gives a 
confession to the police that, in addition to being self-
incriminating, says that the other defendant (Antonio 
Lambert1) pulled the trigger. When Lambert and Garcia are 
jointly tried in Pennsylvania state court, the latter declines to 
testify, thereby depriving the former of the ability to cross-
examine him about the confession. The judge therefore 
redacts the confession in an effort to comply with Bruton v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). As a result, when the jury 
hears Garcia’s confession, Lambert’s name is replaced with 
terms like “the other guy.” The idea is that the inability to 
cross-examine Garcia is harmless if the jury has no reason to 
think that the confession implicates Lambert.  
 During closing arguments, however, there is a twist 
when the prosecutor unmasks Lambert and reveals to the 
jurors that he has been, all along, “the other guy.” Now, 
instead of a conclusion, we have a sequel. Based on a Sixth 
Amendment violation caused by the closing arguments, we 
conclude that Lambert is entitled to relief. We therefore 
                                              
1 In the District Court, Lambert used the name Terry Brown. 
However, at the time of the crime he went by Lambert, and he 
uses that name in our Court.  
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remand so that the District Court can give Pennsylvania (the 
“Commonwealth”) the option either to retry or release him.    
I. Background 
A. The crime 
 Mary Edmond2 was shot near a gas station in North 
Philadelphia on February 23, 2001, and she died later that day 
from her injuries. The police believed that Lambert pulled the 
trigger as part of a robbery gone wrong. Earlier in the day, 
Garcia and his friend Anthony Cheatham had been driving 
around Philadelphia and smoking marijuana in Garcia’s 
Monte Carlo. With Garcia at the wheel, the pair picked up 
Lambert, and together the three of them drove to North 
Philadelphia to buy Xanax pills. Afterward, they drove past 
the gas station, and Lambert told Garcia to pull over. From 
that point onward, two competing narratives emerge. One 
comes from a statement that Cheatham gave the police after 
the shooting coupled with his testimony at trial. The second is 
from Garcia’s statement to the police, which is at the core of 
this appeal. We examine each of the narratives in turn. 
  Cheatham’s version is that he fell asleep in the car 
after taking a Xanax pill. When the trio reached the gas 
station, he was “[l]aid back, stretched out” in the back seat. 
Lambert and Garcia got out of the car, and although 
Cheatham could not see them, he heard a gunshot. When 
Lambert and Garcia returned to the car, the latter asked, 
“What the fuck did you just do?” Lambert then pointed a gun 
at Garcia and ordered him to drive away. Afterward, Lambert 
and Garcia dropped Cheatham off at a friend’s house. 
Detectives found Cheatham the next morning at his 
                                              
2 The victim’s last name is spelled both “Edmond” and 
“Edmund” in the record.  
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grandmother’s house, and he went with them to police 
headquarters, where he was threatened with charges if he did 
not cooperate. He gave a statement at that time and later 
testified at the joint trial of Lambert and Garcia. He was not 
charged in connection with Edmond’s death. 
 Garcia, meanwhile, had a different story, which he 
outlined in a confession3 to the police. In his version, he 
stayed in the car while Lambert and Cheatham got out and 
approached the victim. Garcia saw a “tussle” and witnessed 
the “lady . . . backing up holding her purse.” He continued, 
“She yanked back, she resisted and I heard a gunshot.” When 
the two companions got back in the car, Lambert said that he 
had “banged the bitch” because she “wouldn’t give up her 
pocketbook.” This was a preview of Garcia’s defense at trial, 
which was that he was merely a bystander to the crime.  
 Whereas Cheatham’s account cut off shortly after the 
shooting, when he got to his friend’s house, Garcia’s version 
described additional events. After dropping off Cheatham, 
Lambert went with Garcia to the latter’s house. Lambert 
pulled out the gun and told Garcia that “you better not ever 
cross me or snitch on me because you know what the deal is.” 
Garcia understood this to mean that Lambert would kill him.  
 After seeing the gun, Garcia’s mother asked them to 
leave. They drove away, and in the early hours of February 24 
the two of them, along with another passenger (not 
                                              
3 Following the lead of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, we 
style Garcia’s statement a “confession.” The statement was 
self-incriminating because it established his presence at the 
scene of the crime. We note, however, that it is not a typical 
confession in that Garcia, as discussed below, intended it to 
be exculpatory.  
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Cheatham), were pulled over. Garcia was driving and 
attempted to flee, but the car crashed. According to Garcia, 
Lambert threw him the gun and tried to escape on foot. 
Garcia, now holding the weapon, attempted to do the same. 
Shortly afterward, officers apprehended both of them. 
B. The trial 
  The Commonwealth charged Lambert and Garcia with 
murder (first degree for the former and second degree for the 
latter), conspiracy, robbery, and possession of an instrument 
of crime. It sought a joint trial in state court for the two 
defendants, and Lambert responded with a motion to sever 
(i.e., to have a separate trial for each defendant). At the time, 
it was clear that the Commonwealth intended to use Garcia’s 
confession and that the latter was planning to invoke his Fifth 
Amendment rights by not testifying at trial. Lambert’s 
counsel argued that the combined effect—the introduction of 
the confession without any ability to cross-examine Garcia—
violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.  
 The trial judge agreed that the Commonwealth could 
not, under those circumstances, introduce a full version of 
Garcia’s confession without violating the Confrontation 
Clause. As discussed in Part III below, that would have been 
a classic violation of the Supreme Court’s Bruton decision. 
However, relying on other Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting Bruton, the judge determined that the confession 
could be redacted in a way that satisfied the Sixth 
Amendment, thereby negating the need for separate trials. 
Under Bruton, it is proper for the jury to consider the 
confession against Garcia; it only becomes problematic to use 
it against Lambert. If the confession were redacted so that the 
jury did not know it implicated Lambert, the judge reasoned, 
the risk of improper use could be contained. On that basis, the 
judge denied the motion to sever.  
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 With severance off the table, the parties discussed how 
to implement the redactions. They ultimately settled on using 
terms such as “the other guy,” “one of the guys,” or “the guy 
with the gun” to replace Lambert’s name in the confession.4 
At trial, a detective read to the jury the redacted confession, 
which took the form of questions posed to Garcia and his 
answers. Before the reading, the judge instructed the jurors 
that the confession “may be considered as evidence only 
against [Garcia]” and that they “must not consider the 
statement as evidence against defendant Antonio Lambert.” 
The following is, for our purposes, the key portion of what 
the jury heard. The italicized phrases are replacements for 
Lambert’s name.  
Q: What happened next? 
A: They got in the car and I said what the fuck 
happened. One of the guys said I banged the 
bitch . . . . She wouldn’t give up her pocketbook 
or nothing, so I banged her. . . . I told the first 
guy what the fuck, you didn’t tell me you had a 
burner.  
Q: What is a burner? 
A: A gun. 
Q: What kind of gun did the first guy have? 
A: A .38. He showed it to me in my house after 
he shot the lady. After he shot the lady we went 
to my house and we went inside. He pulled it 
out in the kitchen. I told him to put it away 
because my peoples was [sic] there. My mom 
                                              
4 Cheatham’s name was also replaced with generic identifiers.  
8 
 
told me to get the guy out of her house. We left 
my house and drove down North Philly.  
 The disparities between the statements of Cheatham 
and Garcia proved to be a delicate needle for the 
Commonwealth to thread. It encouraged the jury to believe 
Cheatham’s statement in its entirety and to credit all of 
Garcia’s story except for the part where he remained in the 
car during the shooting while the other two got out. During 
closing arguments, when the prosecutor was attempting to 
discredit Garcia’s insistence that he did not get out of the car 
with Lambert, she made the following statement: 
If Garcia had not been part of what happened, 
how easy would it have been for him to drop 
Lambert off, go home, tell his mother what 
happened, pick up the phone and call the police 
and say I was just with a guy who shot and 
killed somebody? He doesn’t do that. What 
does he do [sic] is this, he takes Lambert to his 
house. They’re at his house and he says the guy 
I’m with brings the gun into my house and I tell 
him put it away because my people are there. 
 Defense counsel, believing that this statement had 
effectively nullified one of the redactions and unmasked 
Lambert as the person who accompanied Garcia home after 
the shooting and pulled out the murder weapon, immediately 
requested a sidebar, but the judge permitted closing 
arguments to continue. After the prosecutor finished, defense 
counsel moved for a mistrial, explaining: 
The reason for [the] mistrial is Your Honor will 
recall that the Court and counsel went through 
painstaking efforts to properly redact Mr. 
Garcia’s statement and one of the first things 
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[the prosecutor] did is whip it out and read from 
it and tell the jury that Mr. Garcia took Mr. 
Lambert back to his house with the gun and 
read the entire portion of that statement 
implicating Mr. Lambert as the other guy. In 
fact, [she] told the jury that Mr. Lambert was 
the other guy. 
The judge denied the motion. Having lost his request for a 
mistrial, defense counsel followed up by asking the judge to 
instruct the jury to disregard the unmasking, but he later 
abandoned the request after deciding that rehashing the 
incident might reinforce in the jurors’ minds the idea that 
Lambert was the other guy.5  
 Before sending the jury to deliberate, the judge 
reiterated the instruction given before the redacted confession 
was read into evidence: that it could only be used against 
Garcia and must not be considered as evidence against 
Lambert. Per defense counsel’s request, the judge did so 
without calling attention to the slip-up during closing 
                                              
5 The statement about Lambert going home with Garcia and 
brandishing the gun was not the only time the prosecutor used 
the confession against Lambert during closing arguments. At 
another point, she said: “It’s an old ugly gun, but it worked. It 
killed Mary Edmond. It did just what Antonio Lambert 
wanted it to do. He managed to shoot her. Why? Because she 
didn’t give up her pocketbook. She resisted it. And that’s 
exactly what Mr. Garcia said in his statement.” As discussed 
below, however, this second instance has not been a focus of 
the post-trial litigation. As such, unless otherwise noted, all 
references to comments by the prosecutor during closing 
arguments pertain to the remarks about Lambert 
accompanying Garcia home and pulling out the weapon.  
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arguments. During deliberations, the jurors asked for a copy 
of Garcia’s confession. Instead of giving it to them, the judge 
had the court reporter read the redacted version. Ultimately, 
the jury convicted Lambert on all counts. Meanwhile, it found 
Garcia guilty of all charges except the weapon-related count.  
C. Post-trial proceedings 
 Lambert appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court. He argued that the trial judge erred by 
denying the motion to sever and that, even if a joint trial were 
proper, the comments in the closing arguments constituted 
prosecutorial misconduct and deprived him of his 
Confrontation Clause rights. A panel of the Court 
unanimously agreed with both arguments and ordered a new 
trial. The Commonwealth appealed to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, which reversed the Superior Court by a 3-2 
vote.  
 In the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision, the 
majority rejected the argument that the trial judge was 
required to grant Lambert’s motion to sever. It wrote that the 
redactions obviated the need for separate trials because 
Garcia’s confession “as redacted did not identify [Lambert], 
or his role, at all.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 925 A.2d 147, 
163 (Pa. 2007). On that basis, it determined that the jury 
should be presumed to have obeyed the judge’s instructions to 
use the confession as evidence only against Garcia.   
 Similarly, the majority disagreed with the Superior 
Court’s conclusion that the prosecutor’s comments during 
closing arguments made a new trial necessary. It agreed with 
Lambert that “[t]here is no point in redacting and sanitizing 
otherwise inculpatory statements of a non-testifying co-
defendant, to facilitate a joint trial, if that protective measure 
approved by the [U.S. Supreme] Court to comport with the 
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Confrontation Clause could be deliberately and directly 
undone by lawyer commentary.” Id. at 159. And the majority 
stressed that it did “not condone the prosecutor’s 
misstatement.” Id. at 160. However, it relied on the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 
(1969), to conclude that the trial judge’s instructions about 
how the confession could (and could not be) used were 
sufficient and that a new trial was not necessary. We discuss 
Frazier, as well as the majority’s reliance on it, in detail in 
Parts III and IV of this opinion.  
 In a dissent joined by then-Chief Justice Cappy, Justice 
Baer wrote that the comments during closing arguments 
violated the Confrontation Clause and that the jury should be 
considered incapable of following the instructions not to use 
the confession against Lambert. He wrote that a “defendant 
is . . . deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause if 
an otherwise effective redaction is corrupted by a 
prosecutor’s comment[s].” Brown, 925 A.2d at 164 (Baer, J., 
dissenting). He noted that under Bruton Lambert would have 
gotten a new trial (and the limiting instructions would have 
been considered inadequate) if Garcia’s confession had been 
read to the jury without redactions. Justice Baer concluded 
that it would be anomalous to reach a different result when a 
prosecutor undoes a redaction by revealing the identity of the 
person whose name was removed. He admonished that “this 
Court should not admit a violation of the fundamental right of 
confrontation and cross-examination by means of a back-door 
revelation, when Bruton so carefully guards the front door.” 
Id. at 166.   
 After unsuccessfully seeking relief under 
Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act, Lambert filed a 
pro se federal habeas petition in the District Court under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254. He raised the severance and prosecutorial 
misconduct arguments rejected by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
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Court, as well as a second prosecutorial misconduct claim and 
certain claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court 
denied the petition. It rejected the arguments not presented to 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (ineffectiveness of counsel 
and the second claim of prosecutorial misconduct) on 
procedural grounds. Meanwhile, it denied relief on the merits 
on the two issues—severance and the first prosecutorial 
misconduct claim—considered by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court. We granted a certificate of appealability as to these 
two claims and appointed counsel to represent Lambert.   
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254, and we have appellate jurisdiction per 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1291 and 2253. We exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s legal conclusions. Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 
178, 191 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 Like that Court, our task is to review a state court 
decision. As such, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) also bears on our analysis. 
Under AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, if a claim 
was “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,” 
we can grant relief only if the state court decision “was 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented” in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The 
decision that gets AEDPA deference is the “last reasoned 
[one] of the state courts on the petitioner’s claims.” Simmons 
v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 231–32 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Here that is the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s reversal of the Superior Court’s judgment. 
Because no facts are in dispute, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
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Court’s decision must stand unless it was “contrary to” or an 
“unreasonable application of” clearly established federal law.   
 We can grant relief under the “contrary to” standard 
only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that 
reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the 
state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] 
Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). Meanwhile, a 
decision from a state court “is an unreasonable application of 
[the Supreme Court’s] clearly established precedent if it 
correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies that 
rule unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case.” 
White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1706 (2014). In this 
context, an “unreasonable application . . . must be objectively 
unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not 
suffice.” Id. at 1702 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 Additionally, a state court applying Supreme Court 
cases has no obligation to extend their rationales. Id. at 1706. 
At the same time, “AEDPA does not require state and federal 
courts to wait for some nearly identical factual pattern before 
a legal rule must be applied.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 
U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Rather, “state courts must reasonably apply the rules squarely 
established by [the Supreme] Court’s holdings to the facts of 
each case.” White, 134 S. Ct. at 1706 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). In determining whether they have done so, 
we are guided by the specificity of the Supreme Court rule 
they are applying. Under that metric, the “more general the 
rule, the more leeway [state] courts have in reaching 
outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” Yarborough v. 
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004).  
 Even if we conclude that a state court decision is 
improper under these standards, we must also examine 
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whether the error was harmless. An error-infected state court 
conviction can stand on habeas review if the mistake did not 
have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in 
determining the jury’s verdict.” Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 
276 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 
619, 637 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied relief on the merits 
without addressing harmlessness, there is no ruling on that 
subject to which we must defer. As a result, our harmlessness 
review is plenary. See Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198 
(2015); Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121–22 (2007). 
III. Bruton and Its Progeny 
 The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant 
the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” 
U.S. Const. amend. VI. And a “major reason underlying [this] 
rule is to give a defendant charged with [a] crime an 
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him.” 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406–07 (1965). Occasionally, 
however, the right to cross-examine runs headlong into 
another constitutional right: the Fifth Amendment’s 
protection against self-incrimination. See U.S. Const. amend. 
V (providing that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself”).6 A classic 
example is our situation here. The Sixth Amendment gives 
Lambert the right to cross-examine Garcia about his 
confession, but the Fifth Amendment allows Garcia to refuse 
to take the stand. The Supreme Court has dealt with different 
                                              
6 The Confrontation Clause and the privilege against self-
incrimination both apply to proceedings in state courts. See 
Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 189 (1987) (Confrontation 
Clause); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (self-
incrimination).  
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variations on this theme, and four of its decisions—Bruton; 
Frazier; Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987); and Gray 
v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998)—guide our analysis. We 
discuss each in turn.  
 In Bruton, two defendants (Evans and Bruton) were 
tried together for an armed postal robbery. Evans, who had 
given a confession that also implicated Bruton, opted not to 
take the stand, but the jury heard his confession in full, 
unredacted form through a postal inspector’s testimony. The 
trial judge instructed the jury that the confession could be 
used against Evans but not against Bruton. The Supreme 
Court held that the reading of the confession was a 
Confrontation Clause violation and that limiting instructions 
were incapable of curing it. 391 U.S. at 135–36. 
 It based its conclusion on the cognitive dissonance that 
results from asking jurors to consider a confession only 
against one defendant. It wrote that “there are some contexts 
in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow 
instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so 
vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations 
of the jury system cannot be ignored.” Id. at 135. It 
continued: 
Such a context is presented here, where the 
powerfully incriminating extrajudicial 
statements of a codefendant, who stands 
accused side-by-side with the defendant, are 
deliberately spread before the jury in a joint 
trial. Not only are the incriminations 
devastating to the defendant but their credibility 
is inevitably suspect, a fact recognized when 
accomplices do take the stand and the jury is 
instructed to weigh their testimony carefully 
given the recognized motivation to shift blame 
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onto others. The unreliability of such evidence 
is intolerably compounded when the alleged 
accomplice, as here, does not testify and cannot 
be tested by cross-examination. It was against 
such threats to a fair trial that the Confrontation 
Clause was directed. 
Id. at 135–36 (footnote omitted).  
 The next year, the Court decided Frazier, which 
involved two cousins (Frazier and Rawls) who were jointly 
indicted. Rawls pled guilty and gave a confession that also 
incriminated Frazier, who elected to proceed to trial. Though 
Frazier’s lawyer told the prosecutor that Rawls intended to 
invoke the Fifth Amendment if called, the prosecutor believed 
he would cooperate and previewed his expected testimony to 
the jury. That “summary [of the expected testimony] was not 
emphasized in any particular way,” and it “took only a few 
minutes to recite.” 394 U.S. at 733. After Rawls eventually 
asserted the Fifth Amendment, Frazier argued that there was a 
Bruton violation because the substance of the incriminating 
statement had been put in front of the jury without an 
opportunity for cross-examination. The Court disagreed and 
concluded that, unlike in Bruton, limiting instructions “were 
sufficient to protect [Frazier’s] constitutional rights.” Id. at 
735. Importantly, at no point during the trial was the jury read 
Rawls’ confession. Rather, it only heard the outline of what 
Rawls was expected to say if he testified.  
 In rejecting Frazier’s argument, the Court highlighted 
four differences between that case and the typical Bruton 
scenario. First, the jury was exposed to a paraphrased version 
of Rawls’ account rather than a verbatim confession. Id. 
Second, the account was introduced during opening 
statements rather than through witness testimony. Id. Third, 
only one defendant was on trial, so the “jury was not being 
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asked to perform the mental gymnastics of considering an 
incriminating statement against only one of two defendants in 
a joint trial.” Id. And finally, “Rawls’ statement was not a 
vitally important part of the prosecution’s case.” Id.   
 The Court noted that it is common for a party not to be 
able to produce all the evidence promised in an opening 
statement and that “[c]ertainly not every variance between the 
advance description and the actual presentation constitutes 
reversible error . . . when a proper limiting instruction has 
been given.” Id. at 736. However, it “may be that some 
remarks included in an opening or closing statement could be 
so prejudicial that a finding of error, or even constitutional 
error, would be unavoidable.” Id.  
 Next up is Richardson. At a joint trial for co-
defendants Marsh and Williams, the prosecution introduced 
the latter’s confession. Williams did not testify, and the judge 
instructed the jury not to use his confession against Marsh. 
The confession recounted, among other things, an 
incriminating conversation that took place in a car carrying 
Marsh, Williams, and Martin (who was charged alongside the 
other two but was a fugitive at the time of trial). Unlike in 
Bruton, however, the confession was redacted before being 
read to the jury. The redactions did not, as did ours, merely 
replace the other defendant’s name with generic terms. 
Rather, the confession “was redacted to omit all reference” to 
Marsh or her role in the crime. 481 U.S. at 203. Thus, the 
version that the jury heard placed Martin and Williams in the 
car but did not mention a third person being there.  
  The potential problem arose when Marsh took the 
stand and testified that she was in the car with Martin and 
Williams. Her argument was that, although Williams’ 
redacted confession did not implicate her on its own, the 
combination of the confession (which described an 
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incriminating conversation in the car) and her testimony 
(which put her in the car) created an intolerable risk that the 
jury would be unable to follow the limiting instruction. In 
other words, the concern was that the jury impermissibly 
would use the confession against her by determining that she 
heard the conversation.  
 The Court rejected this argument, concluding that 
when a “confession [is] not incriminating on its face” toward 
a co-defendant and “bec[omes] so only when linked with 
evidence introduced later at trial,” it is “a less valid 
generalization that the jury will not likely obey the [limiting] 
instruction.” Id. at 208. As a result, it is presumed able to 
consider the confession to determine the speaker’s, but not 
the co-defendant’s, guilt. The Court summarized its holding 
as follows: “[T]he Confrontation Clause is not violated by the 
admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession with a 
proper limiting instruction when, as here, the confession is 
redacted to eliminate not only the defendant’s name, but any 
reference to his or her existence.” Id. at 211.   
 That holding, however, did not end the case. That is 
because, during closing arguments, the prosecutor encouraged 
the jury to do precisely what Marsh feared would happen and 
what the limiting instruction was meant to avoid—to assume, 
based on the combination of the confession and her 
testimony, that she heard the incriminating conversation. The 
Court described this as seeking “to undo the effect of the 
limiting instruction” and called it an “error.” Id. Because 
Marsh’s lawyer did not object to the prosecutor’s comments, 
the Court remanded for a determination of whether they 
nonetheless could serve as a basis for relief. Id. 
 The final piece of the puzzle is Gray, which falls 
somewhere between Bruton and Richardson. As in 
Richardson and unlike in Bruton, the confession was 
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redacted. But whereas the redactions in Richardson removed 
all reference to the co-defendant’s existence, the co-
defendant’s name in Gray merely was replaced with a blank 
space or the word “deleted.” For instance, the jury heard that 
“Me, deleted, deleted, and a few other guys” committed a 
crime. 523 U.S. at 196. The Court held that, when a name is 
replaced “with an obvious indication of deletion,” Bruton 
applies and no limiting instructions can be sufficient. Id. at 
192.  
 It noted that, as in Richardson, the jury would need to 
make inferences for the confession to become incriminating 
(in Richardson by linking the confession to testimony and in 
Gray by divining the identity of the blanked-out name). 
However, it concluded that “inference pure and simple cannot 
make the critical difference, for if it did, then Richardson 
would also place outside Bruton’s scope confessions that use 
shortened first names, nicknames, descriptions as unique as 
the ‘red-haired, bearded, one-eyed man-with-a-limp,’ and 
perhaps even full names of defendants who are always known 
by a nickname.” Id. at 195 (citation omitted). Maintaining 
that its approach was not overly burdensome, the Court 
implied that it might have been permissible to replace “Me, 
deleted, deleted, and a few other guys” (the example from 
above) with “Me and a few other guys,” thereby making the 
inference less obvious. Id. at 196.   
 In sum, there are some cases (Bruton and Gray) where 
no limiting instruction can cure the harm that comes from the 
jury’s exposure to an incriminating confession. Meanwhile, in 
other situations (Frazier and Richardson) we can assume that 
the jury is capable of following instructions. We must now 
consider on which side of the line our case falls.  
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IV. The Bruton Violation in Lambert’s Trial 
 Lambert has two arguments for why his trial violated 
Bruton. First, he contends that it and its progeny required 
severance of his trial from Garcia’s. He claims this is a 
straightforward application of our Bruton-based decisions in 
Vazquez v. Wilson, 550 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2008); Eley v. 
Erickson, 712 F.3d 837 (3d Cir. 2013); and Washington v. 
Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 801 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2015). Next, 
he asserts that, even assuming a joint trial was permissible, a 
Bruton violation occurred during closing arguments because 
of the prosecutor’s comments. He labels this a prosecutorial 
misconduct claim.7 We agree with this second argument and 
conclude, without deciding whether the denial of the 
severance request was proper, that the comments during 
closing arguments violated Bruton.  
                                              
7 At the outset of this appeal, there appeared to be 
disagreement about whether this claim is properly before us. 
“Before a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state 
prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state 
court. In other words, the state prisoner must give the state 
courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents 
those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition.” 
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). To ensure 
that state courts have this opportunity, the petitioner’s claims 
must be “fairly presented” to them. Picard v. Connor, 404 
U.S. 270, 275 (1971). This means that the petitioner must put 
before the state courts the “substantial equivalent” of the 
claims pursued in federal court. Id. at 278. In his brief, 
Lambert, in addition to arguing that the prosecutor’s 
comments violated Bruton, also invoked the Supreme Court’s 
standards for prosecutorial misconduct from Donnelly v. 
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974), and Darden v. 
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  We start from the undisputed premise, stated by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, that “[t]here is no point in 
redacting and sanitizing otherwise inculpatory statements of a 
non-testifying co-defendant, to facilitate a joint trial, if that 
protective measure approved by the [U.S. Supreme] Court to 
comport with the Confrontation Clause could be deliberately 
and directly undone by lawyer commentary.” Brown, 925 
A.2d at 159. Indeed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
conceded that, under the right circumstances, there could be a 
Bruton violation based on an “argument by counsel 
concerning Bruton-redacted evidence.” Id. at 160. As an 
example, it imagined a scenario where a prosecutor tells the 
jury: “You heard the co-defendant’s confession, which also 
described the actions of someone he identified only as ‘the 
other guy;’ well, I’m here to tell you that ‘the other guy’ he 
was speaking of was the defendant and we just changed the 
wording of the statement.” Id. at 159 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is correct, of course, 
that those circumstances would violate Bruton. Were it 
                                                                                                     
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986). Those cases held that 
improper comments by prosecutors result in constitutional 
error when they “so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to 
make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” 
Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Commonwealth 
correctly notes that Lambert did not present an argument 
based on this standard to the state courts. However, as 
discussed below, we resolve this claim based only on Bruton 
and its progeny. Because the Commonwealth agreed at oral 
argument that a Bruton-based attack on the prosecutor’s 
comments was in front of the state courts, the fair 
presentation requirement does not create any obstacles here.  
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otherwise, Bruton would mean little. There would be no point 
in redacting confessions only to have the identities of the co-
defendants blatantly unmasked. And we know from Gray that 
Bruton is not so easily defeated. Otherwise, the Supreme 
Court would not have gone out of its way to say that Bruton 
cannot be circumvented by replacing somebody’s name with 
an obvious identifier (such as the “red-haired, bearded, one-
eyed man-with-a-limp”). Gray, 523 U.S at 195 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Indeed, we discern no difference in 
effect between the situation in Bruton, where the jury heard 
an unredacted statement naming the co-defendant, and one 
where the jury hears a redacted statement but is later told to 
whom the redactions refer.  
 If there were any doubt as to the applicability of 
Bruton to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s hypothetical, 
Richardson eliminated it. On the one hand, Richardson made 
clear that a properly redacted confession does not violate the 
Confrontation Clause when linked with other admissible 
evidence. Yet it also established that a prosecutor’s 
inadmissible use of a confession during closing arguments 
runs afoul of Bruton. That is because it is “error” for a 
prosecutor “to undo the effect of the limiting instruction.” 481 
U.S. at 211.  
 We part company, however, with the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court with regard to the three attempts it made to 
distinguish our case from its hypothetical example. First, it 
implied that a prosecutor’s unmasking of a co-defendant must 
be done “deliberately” for Bruton to come into play. Brown, 
925 A.2d at 159. Any such requirement of intentional conduct 
would be contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law. 
Specifically, the Court in Frazier said that “we do not believe 
that the prosecutor’s good faith, or lack of it, is controlling in 
determining whether a defendant has been deprived of the 
right of confrontation.” 394 U.S. at 736. Here, though there is 
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no evidence that the prosecutor acted in bad faith, that is 
irrelevant for constitutional purposes. Indeed, the 
Commonwealth conceded (as it must) during oral argument 
before us that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court erred by 
suggesting that intent matters.  
 Second, we disagree that the statement needs to be as 
conspicuous as the example presented by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, where the prosecutor tells the jury that the 
confession had been redacted and had previously included the 
co-defendant’s name. During closing arguments, the 
prosecutor revealed that Garcia took Lambert to his house, 
where the latter pulled out the murder weapon. Thus, the 
prosecutor’s comments conveyed a message—that Lambert 
was the person whose name was withheld in the redacted 
confession—as clearly as would have been the case in the 
example used by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.8   
                                              
8 If there had been other evidence that Lambert went home 
with Garcia and took out the murder weapon, the prosecutor 
properly could have relied on that in closing arguments as 
long as she did not also encourage the jury to use the redacted 
confession against Lambert. The Commonwealth argues that 
this is the case here. It says that the prosecutor was not 
undoing the redactions but instead was encouraging the jury 
to draw inferences from other evidence in the record. 
However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected this 
argument and found that “Garcia’s statement was the only 
source suggesting that Garcia took [Lambert] to his house.” 
Brown, 925 A.2d at 156 n.5. Under AEDPA, this factual 
determination is “presumed to be correct,” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(e)(1), and there is no reason here to set aside that 
presumption.  
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 Moreover, Richardson forecloses the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s analysis. As discussed, a redacted 
confession in that case described a conversation that took 
place in a car, and Marsh admitted that she was in that same 
car. The prosecutor put these two facts together in closing 
arguments and asked the jury to draw the inference that 
Marsh heard the conversation. That is much less direct than 
our case, where the prosecutor did more than merely argue an 
inference and instead recounted the confession as though 
Lambert’s name had been in it all along. Though the 
prosecutor in Richardson did not unmask Marsh as a 
passenger in the car—Marsh did that herself through her 
testimony—the Court nonetheless found a Confrontation 
Clause error. 481 U.S. at 211. The only reason why the Court 
remanded rather than granting relief directly was the failure 
of defense counsel to object during closing arguments—a 
failure not present here.  
 In terms of applying this clearly established Supreme 
Court precedent, our opinion in Vazquez provides useful 
guidance.9 There, as here, the prosecutor, without going so far 
as telling the jury that the confession had been redacted to 
omit the co-defendant’s name, “effectively eliminated the 
redaction” through a slip of the tongue during closing 
                                              
9 We do not rely on Vazquez as having created clearly 
established law, as only Supreme Court cases can do that for 
AEDPA purposes. Rather, we look to it to determine the 
principles that we have determined previously to be clearly 
defined by Supreme Court cases. Cf. Marshall v. Rodgers, 
133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (noting that “an appellate panel 
may, in accordance with its usual law-of-the-circuit 
procedures, look to circuit precedent to ascertain whether it 
has already held that the particular point in issue is clearly 
established by Supreme Court precedent”).  
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arguments while paraphrasing the confession. 550 F.3d at 
275. Though we granted relief on other grounds, we also 
interpreted Bruton to leave “no doubt” that the comments 
during closing arguments were “a grave and probably fatal 
constitutional violation.” Id. at 283 n.14. There was “no 
difference between the admission of [the] unredacted 
statement” at the outset and a situation where the prosecutor 
negates the redactions during arguments. Id.; see also Fowler 
v. Ward, 200 F.3d 1302, 1311 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that it 
would “squarely violate[]” the Confrontation Clause even to 
“suggest” that a redacted confession implicated a co-
defendant), overruled on other grounds by Slack v. McDaniel, 
529 U.S. 473 (2000). 
 Finally, we disagree with the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s reliance on Frazier as a means of escaping Bruton’s 
command. As discussed, the Court in Frazier gave four 
reasons for its conclusion. None apply here. The first and 
second factors are that the prosecutor in Frazier 1) 
summarized a confession that 2) was never actually read—
redacted or otherwise—to the jury. Here the jury heard a full 
reading of the redacted confession and then had the redactions 
compromised during closing arguments. This difference is 
critical. The task of the jury in Frazier was merely to pretend 
that there was no confession. By contrast, the jury here was 
asked to consider the confession, but only against Garcia, 
when the prosecutor effectively said during closing arguments 
that it also implicated Lambert. That is the situation Bruton 
describes as “intolerabl[e].” 391 U.S. at 136.  
 Meanwhile, the third Frazier factor—that there was 
only one defendant on trial, so the “jury was not being asked 
to perform the mental gymnastics of considering an 
incriminating statement against only one of two defendants in 
a joint trial,” 394 U.S. at 735—is not present here because 
there was a joint trial and jurors were told that they had to 
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limit their use of the confession to one defendant. Once again, 
this places us squarely within Bruton and its warning that 
“there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will 
not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the 
consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the 
practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be 
ignored.” 391 U.S. at 135.  
 The final factor in Frazier was that the evidence was 
not “vitally important” to the prosecution’s case. 394 U.S. at 
735. As discussed below in explaining why the error was not 
harmless, the evidence here was crucial to the 
Commonwealth’s case.  
 Properly understood, then, Frazier does not carry the 
day for the Commonwealth. Frazier made clear that not all 
mistakes in opening or closing statements are Bruton 
violations. But it never said (or even implied) that Bruton has 
a back door that allows prosecutors to do what the Supreme 
Court has expressly forbidden—dangle an incriminating 
statement in front of jurors, tell them it implicates a particular 
defendant, and then expect that they will not use it against 
that person.  
 We therefore hold, as a matter of clearly established 
Supreme Court law, that the prosecutor’s comments violated 
the Confrontation Clause. There are some circumstances 
when the prosecution can commit what otherwise would be a 
constitutional violation but nonetheless escape a mistrial 
through limiting instructions. However, in cases falling within 
the ambit of Bruton and its progeny, limiting instructions 
cannot cure the error. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135–36. This is 
such a case. In deciding otherwise, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court acted contrary to U.S. Supreme Court law by 
apparently requiring prosecutors to act in bad faith for 
27 
 
protections to arise, and it misapplied Bruton, Frazier, 
Richardson, and Gray by not requiring a mistrial.  
V. Harmlessness 
 Having found an error, we next consider whether it 
was harmless. To determine whether the Bruton violation had 
a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the 
outcome, Bond, 539 F.3d at 276 (internal quotation marks 
omitted), we must look at the evidence that the jury properly 
could have considered against the defendant. Here the 
Commonwealth’s case against Lambert rested almost entirely 
on Cheatham’s testimony. Indeed, Cheatham was the only 
witness with admissible testimony about what Lambert did at 
the gas station. And, because Garcia had the gun at the time 
of the arrest, Cheatham provided the only admissible link 
between Lambert and the murder weapon. But, as noted 
below, Cheatham had substantial flaws as a witness. Hence 
we conclude that the Bruton error was not harmless.  
 Cheatham’s own testimony undercut his reliability and 
usefulness as a witness. By his own admission, he was 
impaired from marijuana and Xanax. As a result, he was 
asleep shortly before the crime. And, more importantly, he 
said he stayed in the back seat the whole time. His most 
powerful statement is that he saw Lambert and Garcia get out 
of the car and, when they got back in, Lambert pointed a gun 
at Garcia and ordered him to drive. But Cheatham never 
claimed to witness the robbery or the murder as they took 
place.  
 Another red flag is that Cheatham added key details to 
his narrative between when he gave a statement to the police 
and when he testified. For instance, the part about Lambert 
pointing the gun at Garcia emerged for the first time in court. 
During cross-examination, Cheatham admitted that he had not 
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included that detail when talking to detectives the day after 
the crime.  
 And Cheatham had a powerful motive to implicate 
Lambert. The former escaped charges by convincing 
detectives that he had remained in the car while Lambert and 
Garcia got out. Garcia was telling an entirely different story 
in which he was merely present for a crime committed by 
Lambert and Cheatham. And Cheatham only gave his 
statement after being told he would be charged with a crime if 
he did not cooperate. This would give the jury reason to view 
Cheatham’s testimony skeptically. 
 The Commonwealth admits that Cheatham is a flawed 
witness but gives us three reasons why it thinks the error was 
nonetheless harmless. They do not persuade us. First, it 
argues that the convictions of both Lambert and Garcia mean 
that the jury must have believed Cheatham (despite his 
weaknesses) and disbelieved Garcia. The consequence, in the 
Commonwealth’s view, is that it would not matter if it 
became obvious that the redacted confession implicated 
Lambert because the jury rejected Garcia’s narrative.  
 We agree that the jury, in convicting Garcia, 
apparently credited Cheatham’s account that Lambert and 
Garcia got out of the car rather than Garcia’s story that 
Lambert and Cheatham did so. But it does not follow that the 
jurors necessarily disbelieved the other portions of Garcia’s 
confession that implicated Lambert as the shooter. These 
parts, which the jury was not supposed to use against 
Lambert, reinforced rather than contradicted Cheatham’s 
spotty testimony. Hence we cannot say that the jury, once 
aware during closing arguments that Garcia’s confession 
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incriminated Lambert, did not make significant use of that 
information.10  
 Next, the Commonwealth notes that the unmasking of 
Lambert happened during a part of the closing arguments 
when the prosecutor was asking the jury to find Garcia guilty. 
Specifically, she was discussing Garcia’s story that Lambert 
and Cheatham committed the crime. If that were true, the 
prosecutor asked, why did Garcia bring one of the criminals 
to his home afterward rather than dropping him off and 
calling the police? It was in this context that she used 
Lambert’s name, rather than a generic identifier, and revealed 
that he was the one who went home with Garcia. Essentially, 
the Commonwealth’s argument is that, based on the structure 
of the closing arguments, the jury would not have been 
tempted to use the information against Lambert. However, as 
discussed below, the information was quite harmful to 
Lambert, and we cannot realistically assume that the jury 
ignored it.  
  The Commonwealth’s final argument is that the 
details that the prosecutor improperly revealed—Lambert 
accompanying Garcia home and pulling out the gun—did not 
add much to the case against Lambert because they related to 
events after the shooting. That misses the point. If the 
redactions were ever effective—a question we do not 
decide—it would be because they effectively encrypted the 
confession by obscuring from the jury part of its meaning. 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor essentially gave the 
                                              
10 The jury’s request to see the confession during 
deliberations also lends possible support to the notion that 
jurors relied on it to convict Lambert. Nonetheless, we do not 
know what motivated the request, and we need not give it any 
particular import in reaching our conclusion.  
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jury the key to break the encryption. And, in doing so, she 
revealed far more to the jury than Garcia’s statement that 
Lambert came home with him.  
 As noted above but repeated here for convenience, the 
key portion of the confession (with the replacements shown in 
italics) is: 
Q: What happened next? 
A: They got in the car and I said what the fuck 
happened. One of the guys said I banged the 
bitch . . . . She wouldn’t give up her pocketbook 
or nothing, so I banged her. . . . I told the first 
guy what the fuck, you didn’t tell me you had a 
burner.  
Q: What is a burner? 
A: A gun. 
Q: What kind of gun did the first guy have? 
A: A .38. He showed it to me in my house after 
he shot the lady. After he shot the lady we went 
to my house and we went inside. He pulled it 
out in the kitchen. I told him to put it away 
because my peoples was [sic] there. My mom 
told me to get the guy out of her house. We left 
my house and drove down North Philly.  
Once the jury knew that Lambert was the person who 
went to Garcia’s house, it could follow the story 
backward to learn that Lambert was the one with the 
“burner” and was therefore the person who shot the 
victim. We are thus unconvinced by the 
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Commonwealth’s attempt to minimize the importance 
of the unmasking. 
 Lambert has argued in federal court that the 
harmfulness of the error was compounded by the 
prosecutor’s flouting of the redactions at another point 
in her closing arguments. As discussed, see supra n.5, 
apart from the comments about Lambert 
accompanying Garcia home, she also told the jury: 
“It’s an old ugly gun, but it worked. It killed Mary 
Edmond. It did just what Antonio Lambert wanted it to 
do. He managed to shoot her. Why? Because she 
didn’t give up her pocketbook. She resisted it. And 
that’s exactly what Mr. Garcia said in his statement.” 
The Commonwealth says that this argument is 
procedurally defaulted because Lambert did not 
explicitly reference these other remarks in state court. 
However, we need not weigh in because, for the 
reasons we have explained above, we conclude that the 
error would not have been harmless even if the 
prosecutor had not made these other comments.  
 Ultimately, given the significance of Garcia’s 
confession to the Commonwealth’s case, Cheatham’s 
potential unreliability, and the absence of other 
evidence identifying Lambert as the shooter, we 
believe that the prosecutor’s unmasking of him as “the 
other guy” had a “substantial and injurious effect” and 
that relief is therefore warranted. Bond, 539 F.3d at 
276 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
VI. Conclusion 
 We expect that this case will be the exception 
rather than the norm. The potential for constitutional 
error could have been mitigated at the outset by 
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granting the motion to sever the trials. After settling on 
a joint trial, the Commonwealth could have, during 
closing arguments, guarded more carefully against the 
special risks posed by redacted confessions. Having 
failed to do so, it nonetheless could have avoided a 
mistrial had the mistake been of the variety that 
Frazier says can be cured through limiting 
instructions. And even after missing these first three 
safety valves, the Commonwealth could have escaped 
this result had the error been harmless.  
  Here, however, the prosecutor’s comments 
created a Bruton violation that was not harmless. We 
therefore reverse the order of the District Court and 
remand with instructions for it to grant Lambert’s 
petition and require the Commonwealth either to 
release him or retry him within a specified and 
reasonable time period.  
